The time is ripe for a re-examination of the question whether foreign exchange intervention can affect the exchange rate. We attempt to isolate two distinct effects: the portfolio effect, whereby an increase in the supply of marks must reduce the dollar/mark rate (for given expected rates of return) and the additional expectations effect, whereby intervention that is publically known may alter investors expectations of the future exchange rate, which will feed back to the current equilibrium price. We estimate a system consisting of two equations, one describing investors' portfolio behavior and the other their formation of expectations, where the two endogenous variables are the current spot rate and investors' expectation of the future spot rate. We use relatively new data sources: actual daily data on intervention by the Bundesbank, newspaper stories on known intervention, and survey data on investors' expectations. We find evidence of both an expectations effect and a portfolio effect. The statistical significance of the portfolio effect suggests that even sterilized intervention may have had positive effects during the sample period. (It tends to be significant only during the later of our two sample periods, October 1984 to December 1987. That intervention appears less significant statistically during the earlier period, November 1982 to October 1984, could be attributed to the fact that little intervention was undertaken until 1985.) For the magnitude of the effects to be large requires that intervention be publically known. Our (still preliminary) estimates suggest that a typical $100 million of "secret" intervention has an effect of less than 0.1 per Cent on the exchange rate, but that the effect of news reports of intervention can be as large as an additional 4 per cent.
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Introduction
Until recently, there was an unusual degree of consensus among economists, and among policy-makers and participants in the financial markets as well, that intervention by central banks in the foreign exchange market did not offer an effective or lasting instrument for affecting the exchange rate, at least not independently of monetary policy. The 1982 G-7 economic summit at Versailles commissioned a study of intervention, known as the Jurgenson report, which found that the effects were small and transitory at most.2
We think that the time is ripe for new statistical testing of the In this paper we do not concentrate on this distinction. We study the intervention operations that actually took place between 1982 and 1987, 2 Many of the econometric results, finding little or no effect, were reported in Rogoff (1984) and Henderson and Sampson (1983) . regardless of whether they were sterilized.
But we do begin in section II with a review of the issues involved.3
In this paper we examine the two possible channels through which intervention (whether sterilized or not) can influence the foreign exchange rate; the portfolio and the expectations channels.
Intervention can, even if sterilized, influence exchange rates through the portfolio channel provided foreign and domestic bonds are considered imperfect substitutes in investor's portfolios. Intervention operations that, for example, increase the current relative supply of mark to dollar assets that private investors are obliged to accept into their portfolios, will force a decrease in the relative price of mark assets.4 Intervention can also influence exchange rates, regardless of whether foreign and domestic bonds are imperfect substitutes, through the expectations channel. The public information that central banks are intervening in support of a currency (or are planning to intervene in the future) may. under certain conditions, cause speculators to expect an increase in the price of that currency in the future.
Speculators react to this information by buying the currency today.
bringing about the change In the exchange rate today.
While some previous empirical studies of foreign exchange intervention operations have found evidence from daily data that central banks have had a statistically significant effect on exchange rates (Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez (1987 Dominguez ( ,1989 ), the studies were not able to distinguish whether the effect was coming through the portfolio or the For authoritative statements, see Henderson (1984) or Obstfeld (1988) .
The exchange rate reaction to an increase in the relative supply of outside foreign assets may be reduced by an increase in their expected rate of return that induces a corresponding increase in demand. The present study brings three distinct sources of information (related to past work by the authors] to bear on the effects of intervention.
First, we measure expectations of the future spot exchange rate by means of survey data on the forecasts of market participants. These data were introduced in another Context by Froot (1987) and Dominguez (1986) .6 Second, we use daily newspaper reports of intervention and related news to distinguish public awareness of intervention operations, a prerequisite for the expectations channel to be operative, from actual intervention operations, a prerequisite for the portfolio channel to be operative. Third, in the relationship connecting asset supplies to the risk premium, we impose the constraint that the coefficient is With the understanding that it be used under certain restrictions.
6
Subsequent studies using such survey data include Frankel and Froot (1988) , Froot and Frankel (1989) , Froot and Ito (1988) and Ito (1989 (Dominguez (1989) , p.3k).
Standard models of exchange rate determination at least allow nonsterilized intervention to have an effect on the exchange rate in proportion to the change in the relative supplies of domestic and foreign money, just as any other form of monetary policy does. The idea that sterilized intervention operations, on the other hand, have any effect at all, is less accepted. Those that conclude that sterilized intervention can have no effect, base their arguments on either "Ricardian equivalence"
or the high substitutability between foreign and domestic bonds. We consider these two arguments in turn.
If government bonds imply the public liability of future taxation to service them, and if investors look far into the future, optimize intertemporally, and internalize the welfare of future generations, then government bonds are not true "outside" assets; they have no more effect on market equilibrium than the issue of an IOU by one private citizen to another. If government bonds are not true outside assets, it follows that swaps in their currency composition have no effect on the foreign exchange 7 market equilibrium.
There are many arguments against Ricardian equivalence, both theoretical and empirical; it is the sort of proposition that one would like to test rather than impose. In any case, in recent years the lines of distinction between "money" and "bonds" have become increasingly blurred.
It is not clear that the creation of a Money Market Deposit Account --For example, Frankel (1979) and Backus and Kehoe (1988) .
which is part of M2. but is the liability of a privately-owned financial institution rather than of the government --should have a fully proportionate effect on the exchange rate, while the issue of a Treasury
Bill has no effect.
Even if it is granted that government bonds are "outside" assets, the second line of argument against the effectiveness of sterilized intervention is that domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, so that changes in their relative supply have no effect.8 A less extreme version of the argument is that substitutability is very high, even if not literally infinite, so that intervention (in the relevant magnitudes) can have very little effect quantitatively. One point that is often missed is that, even if it is true that the effect of sterilized intervention on the differential in rates of return is very close to zero, the effect on the level of the exchange rate may be relatively large. As long as changes in bond supplies matter, they should have a proportionate effect on the exchange rate (which is the relative price of foreign bonds, in the portfolio model, not just the relative price of money) in the absence of changes in the risk premium, no matter how high the degree of substitutability.
Even for those who hold either to Ricardian equivalence or to the assumption that foreign and domestic bonds are perfect substitutes, there remains a channel whereby sterilized intervention can have an effect on 8 In terms of equation (1) below, it is argued that b is infinite, or, in terms of equation (4), that tv is zero. Frankel (1985, 213-215) . Once effects on the expected future rate of change in the exchange rate are taken into account, the exchange-rate effect of a one percent change in the relative supply of foreign assets could be either more or less than one percent. This is especially true of one particular argument why an increase in the 10 An influential statement is Mussa (1981) . See also Kenen (1981) .
supply of government debt today implies an increase in the money supply in the future. The Sargent-Wallace 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," which says that an increase in debt may be explosive if it is not eventually monetized, might not take effect until far after the end of the sample period.
The Bundesbank and other smaller central banks are less prone to complete sterilization than are the U.S. authorities; during periods of undesired dollar weakness, the Bundesbank often buys dollars for marks, and to some extent allows the increase in reserves to swell the German money supply. In this study, we do not prejudge the sterilization question.
To summarize, the expectations channel may or may not require that intervention be allowed to affect future money supplies. The portfolio channel presumably would require that sterilized intervention be effective, but we allow the data to tell us whether this channel is in fact operative.
III. The Standard Econometrics
The portfolio-balance theory says that investors diversify their holdings among domestic and foreign assets --including bonds, if we do not rule them out a Driori on the grounds of Ricardian equivalence --as functions of expected rates of return. Measuring the expected rates of return requires both data on interest rates, which is easy, and data on investors' expectations of exchange rate changes, which is very hard. Some early tests assumed away this problem by setting expected depreciation equal to zero, and simply looking for a relationship between the level of the exchange rate and the supplies of domestic and foreign assets.11 But, 11 For example, Branson, Haltunnen and Masson (1977) . A more recent attempt, with better measures of asset supplies, is Golub (1989 x-a+brp (1) where rp -1DM -+ 5e i is the euroDK interest rate, i is the eurodollar interest rate, and is the expected change in the dollar/mark spot exchange rate. Now invert the equation to express the risk premium as a function of the aggregate supplies of assets that must be held in market equilibrium:
The special case where domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes is the special case where b is infinite, the coefficient in equation (2) is zero, and changes in assets supplies have no effect on the risk premium. According to the rational expectations methodology, the ex post change in the exchange rate, s, can be substituted for the expected
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Coefficients on asset supplies often appeared statistically significant, but with the wrong signs. When the Bundesbank reacts to an increase in the dollar/mark rate by buying dollar assets and selling mark assets, an apparent perverse relationship between the exchange rate and the supply of dollar assets results.
13 See Dooley and Isard (1983) and Frankel (1982a) . change, 5e, because the only difference is a forecast error e that is independent of x (and all other variables that are contemporaneously observable). So we can run a regression on the resulting equation.
The regression estimate of the coefficient b in equation (3) is generally found to be insignificantly different from zero, a failure to reject the null hypothesis of perfect substitutability.14 One possible explanation for this result is that there is insufficient power in the test. One way of bringing additional information to bear is to assume that investors choose their portfolio allocation, x, to optimize a function of the mean and variance of end-of-period wealth, from which it follows that 'equation (1) holds with a constraint imposed: the coefficient is inversely proportionate to v, the variance of the return differential)5 In the case where goods prices are nonstochastic, v is simply the variance of the exchange rate, and a, the minimum-variance portfolio, is closely related to the share of German goods in the consumption basket of the investor. The inverted form, equation (3), becomes:
14 At least that is what studies find when assets supplies x are computed to include not only foreign exchange intervention, but also government budget deficits, and other forms of asset creation that usually dwarf intervention in magnitude. tE.g., Isard (1983), Frankel (1982a) , and Roothe, Clinton, Cote, and Longworth (l985). Studies that focus more narrowly on daily changes in asset supplies through foreign exchange intervention do sometimes find an effect on the differential in rates of return: Loopesko (1984) and Doainguez (1989) .
References include Kouri and da Macedo (1978) , Dornbusch (1983 ), Frankel (1982b , Adler and Dwaas (1983) , and ranson and Henderson (1985) .
where we have defined r to be the constant of proportionality, which is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion.16
The rational expectations methodology assumes that the regression error and forecast error are identical, so that the equation can be estimated subject to the constraint that the coefficient is proportionate to the variance of the error term. Despite the presumed increase in power, the empirical literature generally fails to reject the null hypothesis of perfect substitutability, which is now interpreted as risk-neutrality (r-O))7 This finding is the same when the variance v is allowed to vary over time, as in the popular ARCH models.18
Notwithstanding the elegance of the rational expectations methodology, several econometric problems remain in the estimation of an equation like (4), and they may be responsible for the results. First, the asset supplies x may be measured with error, or the asset demand equation (1) may hold only subject to an error term. In theory, either source of error would be fairly easy to handle, provided that the error (like investors' forecast error e) were independent of But it seems likely that simultaneity bias has been a problem in practice, particularly since the 16 This is the simplified form of the equation in Dornbusch (1983) , where a is interpreted as equal to the share of German goods in the consumption basket of the investor in question. Krugman (1981) pointed Out that a correct treatment of the convexity term that arises from Jensen's Inequality makes the Constant term -(ra -a + l/2)v, instead of -a(rv). In what follows, the variable in the regression is v in either case, and it is only the interpretation of its coefficient that is affected. 17 Frankel (1982b) .
18 For example, Engel and Rodrigues (1989) , Attanasio and Edey (1987) , and Giovannini and Jorion (1989) .
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See Lewis (1988) and Engel and Rodrigues (1989) .
definition of the righthandside variable, the asset share, includes the spot exchange rate s as part of its computation:
where Dfl is the quantity of deutschemark assets supplied to the public, and V is total wealth expressed in dollars. Addressing this possible source of simultaneity bias in the estimation of portfolio-balance equations is one of the several goals of this study.2°I
V. gxpectations. and Our 'Two-EQuation System
The second set of econometric difficulties with estimating equation (4) concern the measurement of the expectations variable in the risk premium.
Even if the rational expectations methodology Is valid, i.e, the forecast error e is uncorrelated in-sample with all other contemporaneous variables,
there Is the undeniable problem that the magnitude of the error term is extremely large. This could lead to low power: a failure to reject riskneutrality even though the coefficient of risk-aversion is in reality greater than zero. Furthermore, there is reason to think that ex post changes in the exchange rate are a particularly bad measure of what Investors expected ex an. Independent estimates of market forecasts of exchange rates, drawn from survey data, suggest that expected depreciation varies closely with the forward discount, while ex post changes in the exchange rate do not, and tend if anything to lie in precisely the opposite direction.21 We choose to measure expectations by using the survey data rather than cx post changes, on the grounds that (a) the evidence of bias 20 In terms of the identification problem, the excluded exogenous variable that will help us estimate the equation is the one that captures public news.
21 Froot and Frankel (1989) .
is damaging for the latter, and (b) the magnitude of the measurement error is almost certainly larger for ex yost changes than for the survey data.
Thus the equation now becomes:
where the error term u is now meant to reflect any measurement error in the data, rather than investors' forecasting errors. In light of the many studies concluding that exchange rate changes have variances that are autocorrelated over time, we choose to estimate the variance v as the daily variance of exchange rate changes over the preceding week. To our knowledge, despite the incipient spread of the use of the survey data, they
have not been used together with data on asset supplies and variances to estimate a risk premium equation.
Equation (6), which captures the portfolio channel through which intervention may have an effect, is only one of two equations in the system we estimate. The other is an equation of expectations formation, where the dependent variable, investors' forecast of the expected future spot rate, is measured using the survey data.
Past work with the survey data shows clearly that the expected future spot rate, in general, fluctuates roughly one-for-one in proportion to the most recent realized spot rate. But other factors enter the equation as well. Froot (1987,1988) 22 Its coefficient is only positive, with a slightly less-than-unit coefficient on the contemporaneous spot rate, when the forecast horizon is 3 months or longer. 23 There is evidence that most foreign exchange trading takes place among banks, with rapid turnover and correspondingly short investment horizons. The recent New York Fed census of foreign exchange trading found that in April 1989 only 4.9 per cent of banks' trading was with a nonfinancial firm. In other words, banks trade with each other much more than with ultimate customers. See Goodhart (1988) and Frankel and Froot (1988) for more on this theme.
24 The Germans began to intervene seriously to try to push the dollar down in February 1985 (Funabashl. (1988 ).
The specification we choose here is general in that it allows for both extrapolative and adaptive expectations. At the 4-week horizon, respondents have been observed to put negative weight on the lagged spot rate and more-than-unit weight on the contemporaneous spot rate, so that they are extrapolating the recent trend into the future to get their 25 forecast.
Previous work has also found evidence that respondents form their predictions adaptively, putting positive weight on the lagged survey prediction (Frankel and Froot (1987) Frankel and Froot (1988) . Models based on technical analysis (which often essentially extrapolate past trends) are more widely-used by professional forecasting services, especially at short horizons, than models based on macroeconomic fundamentals (which could be viewed as regressive expectations). Euromoney magazine runs a yearly review of foreign exchange forecasting services; of 27 firms covered in 1988, 12 used only technical models, only I relied exclusively on fundamentals models, and 12 used a combination of the two techniques. particular direction, or that a G-7 meeting may be scheduled in response to exchange rate worries.
We also include a variable for "reported intervention" equal to a dummy variable for newspaper reports of intervention (a subset of the reports captured by the NEWS variable) multiplied by the amount of true intervention. This variable allows us to quantify the difference between publically known intervention of a given size and discrete (so-called "stealth," or secret) intervention.
The second equation in our system is thus:
where '+k is log of the ?*IS survey prediction of the spot rate in period t+k, a is the log of the contemporaneous spot rate, s_ is the log of the spot rate on the day of the last MNS survey, NEWSt is a (1,0,-i) dummy variable which captures reports of exchange rate policy news, and PEPIt is reported Bundesbank and Fed intervention measured in dollars. We choose to date the "contemporaneous" spot rate at 7:00 a.m. EST, so that we can be sure that it is known to market participants when they formulate the forecasts that they report to MMS International the next morning.
Nevertheless simultaneity may be a problem: if demand for dollars relative to marks at 7:00 a.m. EST is in part determined by expectations reflected in the next mornings survey, then the contemporaneous spot rate S is endogenous. But our set-up is designed to deal with precisely this problem: we have two endogenous variables, a and s, and two equations to be estimated simultaneously. In terms of the identification problem, the exogenous variables that are excluded from equation (7) and that can serve as instrumental variables for s are the variance v and the total quantity of marks sold in foreign exchange intervention (measured in marks) 1DM.
V. The Estimation Results
The regression results for the expectation equation (7) all of the tables we present results for three measures of the intervention variable. "1-day" intervention is Fed and Bundesbank purchases of dollars on the day before the survey. "14-day' or "7-day" intervention is cumulated between survey dates, so that it measures total Fed and Bundesbank dollar purchases since the last survey. "Total" intervention is cuniulated from the beginning of the sample period and therefore measures the relative stock supplies of outside assets denominated in dollar and mark currencies.
We begin with the expectations equation (7), reported in Tables 1A,B and 4A,B. When equation (7) is estimated by OLS allowing for a serial correlation correction (Tables IA,B) , the coefficient on the difference between the lagged and contemporaneous spot rate is always negative, as in the destabilizing extrapolative model.26 The estimated extrapolative coefficient tends to be larger in magnitude when the regression is estimated using instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity of the spot rate (Tables 4A,B estimates (Table 16 ) and for the instrumental variables estimates (Table   46 ). The reported intervention variable is significant in two of the three instrumented regressions for the latter sample period (table 46) .
We now turn to the risk-premium, the portfolio equation (6). We present OLS regression results for (6) in Tables 2A,B and 3A,B and 26 These are similar to estimates in Frankel and Froot (1988) .
instrumental variable results in Tables SA,B Tables 2A,S and SA,B, and as a percent of total wealth U in Tables 3A,S and 6A.B. (Wealth, U, is measured as the total supply of U.S. and German federal goverruaent debt that has been issued and so must be held in investors' portfolios.) The first alternative is the approach of Loopesko (1984 ) and Dominguez (1987 . In the case when the intervention variable is simply expressed in number of dollars bought on the foreign exchange market (times the variance), its coefficient should be interpreted as nW. rather than simply as r. The second alternative --which is the approach of Isard (1982,1983) , Frankel (l982a,1982b) , and Soothe, Clinton, Cote and (Table 56) or as a percent of wealth (Table 6B ).°T ables 7 and 8 present OLS and instrumental variable estimates, respectively, over the latter sample period for an unconstrained version of the portfolio equation (equation (3)) that enters the variance and asset supplies linearly, rather than constraining them to enter in multiplicative form.31 The OLS results in Table 7 are similar in terms of statistical significance to the analogous constrained version results presented in Table 26 . Likewise, the instrumental variable results in Table 8 are similar to those presented in Table SB . These results suggest that even using the simple linear specification, we can generally reject perfect asset substitutability in the latter sample period.
The finding that the instrumented coefficients on the intervention variable are generally statistically significant in equations 3 and 6 (for the latter sample period) implies that intervention has an effect, even if sterilized. The reason is that if mark and dollar assets' were perfect substitutes, then the coefficient should be zero: changes in asset supplies would have no effect on the risk premium.
30 Recall that, in theory, the coefficient of the product of the intervention variable and the variance is the coefficient of relative riskaversion. Uben intervention is defined as percent of wealth the estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion implicit in the Tables are extremely large. This result is an artifact, not of the particular estimation technique, but of the optimal-diversification theory, as has been noted before: e.g., Krugman (1981) . It follows from equation (4) that for intervention to have a non-negligible effect on the risk premium, either the coefficient of risk-aversion r must be much higher than 2, or the proper denominator for x must be much smaller than the total stock supply of marks and dollars.
31 Analogous unconstrained regression results using the one-week-ahead expectations survey data are presented in Appendix Tables A7 and AS. 21
VI. A Summary of the Ouantitative Effects
For purposes of illustration, we now cry out some sample parameter estimates in calculations of the effect of intervention on the exchange rate. We assume in these experiments that interest rates in Germany and the United States are held Constant (which, for some readers, might mean that we are talking about sterilized intervention). If interest rates were allowed to vary, then the effects in a general portfolio-balance model might be either smaller or larger than those reported here, depending on whether the intervention were sterilized or not sterilized.
First, consider the effect of intervention on the exchange rate if it is not known publically. tRecall that this experiment precludes any effects that run via expectations of future asset supplies.J We begin with the baseline case where expectations are assumed to be neither extrapolative nor adaptive. If one wants to take the extrapolative and adaptive parameters to be non-zero, the baseline case is still relevant as a description of the long-run equilibrium (where 35-i and are zero). Under these assumptions, the intervention has no effect at all on the risk premium.
It follows from equation (6) To get large effects on the exchange rate, we need the public to hear the news of the intervention. Our second experiment considers the effect of such information in isolation, as reflected in the coefficient on our NEWS variable, even if such intervention is in fact not taking place.
[If intervention actually takes place is publically reported, then its total effect would be the sum of the (small) effect reported in the preceding paragraph, plus the (much larger) effect reported in this paragraph, plus the effect implied by the coefficient on the KEPI variable when significant.) Under our baseline case (no change in interest rates and no extrapolative or adaptive expectationsi, the risk premium simply changes by the coefficient of NEWS in the expectation equation: .007, to take an INST estimate for one-month-ahead expectations in Table 4B . Such a change in the risk premium will have a large effect on the demand for mark versus dollar assets.
The effct of the change on the exchange rate is simply proportional to the effect on x/lx, the ratio of the portfolio demand for marks to the portfolio demand for dollars. Our preferred estimate of the coefficient on from equation (6), for Federal Reserve I-day intervention, is 168,903 (this is from the third row of These effects seem rather high (and they would be considerably higher if the estimate was taken from the coefficient on Bundesbank intervention, rather than that on Federal Reserve intervention). One's intuition that the effect should in reality be smaller can easily be fit into any of several categories. First, it is possible, even if we are talking about intervention that is sterilized in the sense that there is no change in the money supply, that the interest rates will absorb some of the impact of the decreased demand for mark assets (the Cerman interest rate rising and the U.S. Interest rate falling), so that the depreciation of the mark will be smaller. One would need to specify a complete portfolio balance model to 24 answer how big the changes in the interest rates would be. But the effect on the nominal interest differential would only have to be 35 basis points to wipe out half of the reported effect on the spot rate.
Second, if one wishes to deviate from the baseline case to consider the possibility of extrapolative expectations, then the effects reported above obtain only in the long-run equilibrium in which s-a1 is zero. The short-run impact effect could be smaller.32 For some readers an intuitively appealing implication of extrapolative expectations is that, after the first-week impact of the news, market forecasters react further to the observed change in the exchange rate by jumping on the bandwagon, so that the effect grows in subsequent weeks.33 Others may prefer to believe that expectations are regressive rather than extrapolative; or that newspaper reports or other random disturbances to the level of the spot rate, to the extent that they are not confirmed subsequently by actual observed changes in macroeconomic fundamentals, will gradually lose their effect on the spot rate as time passes, and that this "unwinding factor" is not adequately captured in our equations. This last possibility would 32 On the other hand, if market participants are believed to have adaptive or regressive expectations, then the impact in short-run equilibrium will be higher than in long-run equilibrium, the familiar overshooting hypothesis. Estimates in Frankel and Froot (1988) show that expectations are extrapolative at the short-term horizons, but turn regressive at 6-month and 1-year horizons.
[We did not try these horizons in our estimates here, partly because they are only available (from the Financial Report) at six-week. intervals.j C.Fred Bergsten. for example, has urged that Central Banks intervene by "leaning into the wind," which could be interpreted as getting a bandwagon or snow-balling effect going.
constitute a third factor that could reduce the effect on the spot rate in long-run equilibrium below that reported above.34
Our own inclination is to believe that expectations only tend to be extrapolative in occasional periods: "speculative bubble" environments, when the foreign exchange market "loses its moorings" and forecasters forget about fundamentals. Of course, these are precisely the periods in which Central Bankers might be most interested in using the tool of 35 intervention.
The last circumstance in which the effect on the spot rate would be less than that estimated here is if the event occurs during a period when the variance is higher than it is on average. Again, these might be the precisely periods in which Central Bankers would be most interested in using intervention as a short-term tool, to smooth "disorderly markets."36 A related point concerns the famous "Lucas critique." If the Central Bank adopted a policy of routinely making public announcements of its intervention --which is not its practice now --each announcement would not continue to have the same impact as in our estimates (unless, perhaps, it was sufficiently backed up by a correspondingly greater degree of actual changes in asset supplies). Our estimates only purport to say what the effect was during the regime actually in effect during the sample period.
References include Krugman (1985) , Frankel (1985) , Harris (1985) , Frankel and Froot (1988) , and Williamson and Miller (1987) . 36 On the other hand, the financial press often talks of central bankers' intervention operations as seeking to have an effect on market behavior precisely by creatinE extra volatility, and thereby "punishing" nasty speculators. Our estimates imply that a change in volatility can indeed have a significant impact on investors' asset demands. But, aside from the difficulty of driving out nasty destabilizing speculators without also driving out good stabilizing speculators, and aside from the general undesirability of creating needless volatility, there is another problem with this theory. If the supply of dollar assets in the market exceeds the share in the minimum-variance portfolio, then an increase in the variance will work to deDrecjae the dollar (for a given risk premium), which may not be the direction desired by the authorities.
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Our results cannot be viewed as definitive. We plan to extend the framework in several directions, such as including other currencies.
Nevertheless, to sum up, the findings for the dollar/mark rate during our mid-l980s sample period are generally favorable for the effectiveness of intervention. There appear to be statistically significant effects through the expectations channel through the portfolio channel.
The quantitative effects can vary, depending both on the particular estimates chosen for the key parameters and on the precise experiment that one wishes to consider. But we hope that the statistical significance of the effects that we find will contribute to a re-evaluation of the conventional wisdom as to the ineffectiveness of intervention.
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